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ABSTRACT
Deep learning algorithms have been known to be vulnerable to adversarial perturba-
tions in various tasks such as image classification. This problem was addressed by
employing several defense methods for detection and rejection of particular types
of attacks. However, training and manipulating networks according to particular
defense schemes increases computational complexity of the learning algorithms. In
this work, we propose a simple yet effective method to improve robustness of con-
volutional neural networks (CNNs) to adversarial attacks by using data dependent
adaptive convolution kernels. To this end, we propose a new type of HyperNetwork
in order to employ statistical properties of input data and features for computation
of statistical adaptive maps. Then, we filter convolution weights of CNNs with the
learned statistical maps to compute dynamic kernels. Thereby, weights and kernels
are collectively optimized for learning of image classification models robust to
adversarial attacks without employment of additional target detection and rejection
algorithms.
We empirically demonstrate that the proposed method enables CNNs to sponta-
neously defend against different types of attacks, e.g. attacks generated by Gaussian
noise, fast gradient sign methods (Goodfellow et al., 2014) and a black-box attack
(Narodytska & Kasiviswanathan, 2016).
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep convolutional neural networks are powerful and popular algorithms that achieve state-of-the-art
performance in various computer vision tasks, such as object recognition. Despite the advances made
by the recent architectures (Krizhevsky et al., 2012; Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014; Szegedy et al.,
2015; He et al., 2016), they are discovered to be fragile to small but carefully directed perturbations of
images (Szegedy et al., 2013), such that the targeted images can be classified to incorrect categories
with high confidence, while humans are still able to correctly classify the attacked images, being
undisturbed or even unaware of the perturbations. The vulnerability of these networks to these, so
called adversarial examples, may lead to undesirable consequences in safety- and security-critical
applications. Papernot et al. (2017) provide an example of misclassification of traffic signs which
could be a significant threat for autonomous driving systems that employ deep learning algorithms.
Various adversarial attack methods for neural networks have been studied in numerous works. The
majority of attack methods can be catalogued in three groups.
1. Methods which use unspecific statistical noise: In this group, input images are perturbed
using unspecific statistical noise, e.g. Gaussian noise, salt and pepper noise and blurring. Since
shape and parameters of distribution functions that are used to generate noise are not determined,
it is usually not easy to obtain a highly confident misclassification results with imperceptible
perturbations (Szegedy et al., 2013).
2. Gradient based attack methods: They are used to generate high confidence imperceptible
adversarial examples within few steps or one-shot gradient based noise. Some examples of the
methods considered in this group are (Iterative) Fast Gradient Sign Method (Goodfellow et al.,
2014; Kurakin et al., 2016), L-BFGS (Tabacof & Valle, 2016), Jacobian-based Saliency Map
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(Papernot et al., 2016a) and DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016). These methods require a
white-box environment in order to make attacks. In other words, the full network architecture and
weights are required to be accessible in order to obtain gradients towards input images.
3. Black-box attack methods. These methods assume that only the output of the networks
can be accessed. Substitute networks (Papernot et al., 2017) and greedy search of noisy pixels
(Narodytska & Kasiviswanathan, 2016) are considered in this group. It is worth mentioning that,
methods such as transferring adversarial examples from another network, which is optimized with
a sufficient part or the whole training datasets, are not considered as a genuine black-box method.
In this work, inspired by the recent works (De Brabandere et al., 2016; Ha et al., 2016) that construct
neural networks with data dependent weights, we propose a simple yet effective method to train
CNNs by improving their robustness to adversarial perturbations. Our main idea is to adaptively filter
convolution weights of CNNs by using statistical properties of input data and features. Concretely, we
propose a HyperNetwork to compute statistical adaptive maps using these statistical properties (mean
and variance) of input data and features for each input channel. Then, we obtain data dependent
kernels for convolution operations by computing Hadamard (element-wise) product of computed
maps and convolution weights. Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We propose a new type of CNN architecture that employ HyperNetworks to dynamically
generate data dependent convolution kernels with statistical properties of input data and features.
2. We empirically verify the robustness of our proposed models using large scale vision dataset,
and demonstrate that their robustness is improved without using additional aforementioned
computationally complex defense methods or spending effort to generate adversarial examples
for training.
RELATED WORKS ON DEFENSE AND HYPERNETWORK
Several defense methods have been proposed in the last decade, e.g. evolving uncertainty during
training (Papernot et al., 2016b), training with adversarial examples (Jin et al., 2015; Zheng et al.,
2016; Tramèr et al., 2017), and training a smarter conjugate network for detecting adversarial
perturbations (Metzen et al., 2017).
The most intuitive approach is to employ adversarial examples during training phase. Goodfellow et al.
(2014) propose to augment the training set with adversarial examples. That is, they simultaneously
minimize the loss for original examples and the adversarial ones that are generated according to the
aforementioned fast gradient sign method based on current weights. Tramèr et al. (2017) further
ensemble the training data with adversarial examples produced from pre-trained models. They
suggest that training with adversarial examples produced from the model being trained will lead
to a degenerate minima, where the model is still undefended, except that its gradient points into a
non-adversarial direction. Zheng et al. (2016) propose to append a stability term to the objective
function, which regularize the model to produce similar outputs for original examples and their
perturbed versions, without considering the classification loss of perturbed examples. This approach
is experimentally shown to be able to maintain or improve state-of-the-art performance on the original
task.
Papernot et al. (2016b) propose an approach based on defensively distilling knowledge from a
conjugate network that shares the same structure. Precisely, the conjugate network is trained first with
hard (binary) labels to prepare soft (0− 1 probability) labels, a temperature T is further employed to
control the uncertainty during the distillation. Although facing the risk of degraded performance, this
type of defense is able to prohibit gradient based attacks by shrinking the magnitude of gradients
with respect to the input image. Metzen et al. (2017) propose a method to augment deep neural
networks with a conjugate network which is trained on the binary classification task of distinguishing
genuine data from data containing adversarial perturbations. They show empirically that adversarial
perturbations can be detected surprisingly well even though they are quasi-imperceptible to humans.
However these methods are usually cumbersome to carry out, either require more resources such
as memories for the conjugate network, or longer training period due to the harder convergence
properties caused by adversarial examples (Tramèr et al., 2017). In addition, their performance for
clean examples may decrease. Moreover, these defense methods are not proposed to be cross-domain
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Figure 1: An overview of the proposed Hyper-Convolution layer at which statistical properties of
data are used.
in general, and most of them are designed using prior information on incoming attacks, and have less
or none robustness toward other types of attacks.
Recently De Brabandere et al. (2016) propose a type of neural network using weights generated
dynamically conditioned on an input (Dynamic Filter) with a small network. This type of architecture
is able to increase flexibility of neural network without an excessive increase in the number of model
parameters. They have empirically verified that a wide variety of filtering operations, such as local
spatial transformations, as well as selective (de)blurring or adaptive feature extraction can be learned
in this way. Ha et al. (2016) further generalize the architecture with HyperNetworks, and propose the
static HyperNetworks as a weights factorization approach for deep convolutional networks. Although
proved to be powerful, this architecture has not been used in large scale vision tasks due to the high
dimension of weights in the recent state-of-the-art convolutional neural network architectures.
2 OUR APPROACH
2.1 ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES IN DEEP LEARNING
We define adversarial examples as follows. Suppose that we are given a deep convolutional neural
network optimized for standard object classification tasks pI = FW(I), where p ∈ RC is a vector of
probability values, andW is the set of weights used at all layers of the network. Then the prediction
of the network can be expressed as yp = argmaxc(pI), where p is the predicted probability for
each class c ∈ C. The ground truth label of I is denoted by y . An adversarial example is denoted by
Iadv , whose prediction label is yp 6= y , while it is kept relatively close to the original example I ,
D(I, Iadv ) < , where D is a chosen measure such as the l2 distance. The desired output either can
be trivial that only makes the network mis-classify Iadv , or can be targeted to a special class yt such
that yp = yt with a high confidence.
2.2 STATISTICAL HYPER-CONVOLUTION
An L layer convolutional neural network FW can be expressed as a series transformations each of
which applies a spatial convolution operation Gl by Y l = σl(G l(Wl,X l)) at the lth layer, where σ
is a functional module such as activation, normalization or soft-max, andX0 = I,X l+1 = Y l. We
use Wl to denote the corresponding weights that are employed at each layer, andW = {W l}Ll=1 is
the set of weights used in the network. In the later discussions, we omit the superscripts of the layer
index l for simplicity.
Vanilla CNNs carry out convolution between feature maps (or an input image) and stationary kernels
by G(W,X) = W ⊗X , where W ∈ RC×D×S×S , X ∈ RD×H×W , C is the number of output
channels,D is the number of input channels, and S is the size of kernels. Our main idea is to adaptively
filter convolution weights of CNNs using a HyperNetwork (Ha et al., 2016) Tθ that is parameterized
by θ. For this purpose, the network Tθ receives the channel-wise mean and standard deviation of
inputX as its input, and outputs a mapM ∈ RS×S , which can be computed byM = Tθ(µX ,σX),
where µX ,σX ∈ RD. Then, we compute Hadamard (element-wise) product () over each S × S
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sub-kernels of the convolution weight W , and compute the map HC,D = WC,D M . Finally,
we employ the obtained adaptive convolution kernels to perform the convolution operation, by
G(H,X) =H ⊗X . Figure 1 provides an overview of this procedure. We choose the network Tθ to
be an ordinary two-layer neural network which employs l2 regularization, and which hasD/2 neurons
in the hidden layer. ReLU is used as the activation function at the hidden layer, while the output
layer employs sigmoid such that the elements ofM take values in (0, 1). We use TΘ = {T lθl}Ll=1 to
denote the set of Tθ employed at each layer, and FW,T to denote the convolutional neural network
equipped with SHC.
The parameters θ computed at each layer are updated simultaneously with W using SGD with
momentum after receiving the gradient ∂J∂θ by
∂J
∂Y · ∂Y∂H · ∂H∂M · ∂M∂θ . It is worthy mentioning that,
HyperNetworks also back-propagate errors (or gradients) from upper to bottom layers by ∂Y∂M · ∂M∂X .
We call this back-propagation route the HyperNetwork route, and the ordinary back-propagation
route passing through the convolution operation the Convolution route. The total back-propagated
error can be computed as the summation of errors propagating from both routes at each layer.
2.3 ATTACKS USED IN THIS WORK
Gaussian Noise Gaussian noise is the most commonly used attack type. In this paper, we employ a
truncated version of Gaussian noise that restricts change of pixels within [−, ] by
Iadv = Clip[ I +N (0,σ),  ]. (1)
Fast Gradient Sign Goodfellow et al. (2014) proposed a white-box method to find perturbations by
Iadv = I +  · Sign(∇IJ(I, y)), (2)
where J(I, y) is a loss function such as yp for the trivial case (yp = y), or standard categorical cross-
entropy (CCE) loss with the targeted class CCE(yt,pI). In this paper, we employ yt = argminc(pI)
as the targeted class.
This method can be extended to an iterative style (Kurakin et al., 2016), where a smaller bound α < 
is used for each step, and the output of the previous iteration will be clipped to apply changes in
[−, ].
Iadv0 = I, I
adv
n+1 = Clip[ I + α · Sign(∇IJ(I, y)),  ]. (3)
Tramèr et al. (2017) proposed a simple yet powerful novel attack that first applies a small random
perturbation to an input, before finding the optimal perturbation under a first-order approximation,
which can be formulated by
I ′ = I + α · Sign(N (0, I)), Iadv = I ′ +  · Sign(∇I′J(I ′, y)). (4)
LocSerachAdv Narodytska & Kasiviswanathan (2016) proposed an iterative approach that can
efficiently locate a small set of pixels, without using any gradient information, which leads to mis-
classification by a deep neural network when it is perturbed. The algorithm targets to push the true
label y below the k th variable of the probability vector pI . Briefly, it takes the output from the
previous step (which is a clean image for the first step), and generates different perturbed versions,
using a semi-random method according to the location of perturbed pixels in the previous step. Then,
it performs a greedy search to select the pixels that fool the network most, and construct a new
(perturbed) image. Although it has a chance of failure, this type of attack is still indefensible by far,
since the applied perturbations do not depend on the architecture of the target network nor how the
network is optimized.
3 EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
3.1 MEASUREMENT OF MODEL ROBUSTNESS
In the experimental evaluation of the method, we introduce a new method, called Relative Confidence
Diminution (RCD) score, to measure its robustness to attacks in addition to classification accuracy.
More precisely, RCD score is used to compute the difference between the Relative Confidence (RC),
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Clean RCD=1.13 RCD=3.08 RCD=4.76 RCD=5.85 RCD=6.54
σ=0.00, py=0.94 σ=0.05, py=0.77 σ=0.10, py=0.33 σ=0.15, py=0.11 σ=0.20, py=0.05 σ=0.25, py=0.01
Figure 2: An example of the RCD score obtained using different levels of Gaussian noise attacks.
Table 1: Analysis of robustness of the models to random Gaussian noise. The accuracy and the RCD
scores are averaged over all 50,000 validation examples.
Network
clean σ=0.1 σ=0.2 σ=0.4
Acc.(%) Acc.(%) RCD Acc.(%) RCD Acc.(%) RCD
Plain-10 60.74 49.49 0.89 43.88 1.24 31.23 2.11
Plain-10-SHC 64.32 53.25 0.92 47.63 1.36 34.02 2.44
ResNet-18 71.16 62.49 0.92 58.43 1.29 48.41 2.19
ResNet-18-SHC 73.48 64.61 0.95 61.08 1.32 52.58 2.18
ResNet-50 76.67 69.36 1.00 65.79 1.41 57.55 2.44
ResNet-50-SHC 77.79 71.12 0.92 67.89 1.31 61.02 1.96
which can be formulated as the log ratio of confidence for the correct label and the variance of the
noisy labels by
RCDF (Iadv, I) = RCF (I)− RCF (Iadv) = log
pIadv,y
SD[pIadv,k ]k 6=y
− log pI,y
SD[pI,k ]k 6=y
, (5)
where SD stands for Standard Deviation. Intuitively, RCD score can be considered as a difference in
“signal noise ratio” between predictions, and provide an intuition on how much the model is affected,
when the adversarial perturbation is not strong enough to lead a misclassification. An adversarial
perturbation that increases the confidence of an incorrect label will result a higher SD[pI,k ]k 6=y , thus
we will obtain a larger RCD score. Figure 2 shows an example of RCD score obtained by employment
of Gaussian noises with different σ.
3.2 EXPERIMENT CONFIGURATIONS AND RESULTS
In this section, we employ three sets of different models for evaluation: ResNet-18, ResNest-18-SHC;
ResNet-50, ResNet-50-SHC (the SHC is only employed in convolution layers with 3× 3 kernel size)
(He et al., 2016); a smaller prototype 10-layer plain network (denoted as Plain-10 and Plain-10-SHC).
The Plain-10 network has the same number of channels for output feature maps as ResNet, but only
has one convolution block (two 3 × 3 convolution layers) at each resolution. These models are
optimized by classifying 1000 classes of ILSVRC-2012 dataset (Russakovsky et al., 2015), using the
same learning scheme provided in He et al. (2016). The training and validation images are re-scaled
within range [0, 1], all the hyper-parameters of the attacks follow this range. During testing, the
validation images are first re-sized to 299× 299, then the single center crop of 256× 256 is fed into
the networks. We employ 3 types of aforementioned attacks to generate adversarial examples. In this
work, we put stress on the robustness of the networks other than the perceivability of perturbations.
Therefore, beside generating imperceptible perturbations, we also introduce sets of parameters that
are able to create heavier perturbations on the images, which may be able to be perceived by human
in some cases.
Gaussian noise In this test, we evaluate the robustness of network towards random Gaussian noise
on the whole validation set of ILSVRC-2012, and the noisy examples are generated using (1). We
perform the tests using three different standard deviation (σ) of noise and the results are reported in
Table 1. It can be seen that the performance of networks equipped with SHC is boosted in all the
cases, and their robustness toward Gaussian noise is kept the same with the Plain-10 network, and it
is improved by ∼ 2% for ResNet-18 and ResNet-50.
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Table 2: Analysis of robustness of the models against fast gradient sign method and its variants. We
attack 5,000 images that are initially correctly classified with high confidence (> 0.9), the accuracy
and RCD score are averaged over the corresponding 5,000 adversarial examples.
Network
FGSM FGSM-Heavy I-FGSM RAND+FGSM
Acc.(%) RCD Acc.(%) RCD Acc.(%) RCD Acc.(%) RCD
Plain-10 3.06 10.54 0.94 11.51 1.90 14.11 0.40 12.57
Plain-10-SHC 16.66 9.44 8.38 10.58 14.14 10.91 6.98 11.77
ResNet-18 10.54 9.78 3.54 11.67 6.18 12.48 1.94 11.46
ResNet-18-SHC 44.34 7.53 23.64 9.68 37.56 8.74 28.16 9.21
ResNet-50 28.46 8.84 20.02 9.84 16.78 10.68 9.94 10.72
ResNet-50-SHC 42.40 7.88 31.16 8.99 28.40 9.57 27.38 9.52
Gradient based attack In this test, we evaluate the robustness of network to Fast Gradient Sign
Method and it’s variants. For each comparison pair, we select 5,000 validation images that are
correctly classified by both reference networks and SHC networks with high confidence (> 0.9), and
create adversarial examples according to the equations (2), (3) and (4). For the original FGSM, we
employ the parameter  = 0.02, and then we further employ another  = 0.1 (denoted by FSGM-
Heavy) to examine the performance of proposed method under strong adversarial perturbations. For
the Iterative FGSM attack, we employ  = 0.02 and α = 0.001 with 5 epochs. For the Rand FGSM
attack, we employ  = 0.03125 and α = 0.03125 which perturb at most 8/256 of the pixel values.
The results of averaged accuracy and RCD are given in Table 2. Obviously, even without utilizing
any type of defensive techniques during training, the proposed SHC networks obtain robustness to
the gradient based attacks regardless of the methods and their strength. Meanwhile, it can be seen
from the RCD scores that the gradient based attacks are better at confusing the networks than pure
noise, and the effectiveness of different methods is different for different models. For instance, the
RAND+FGSM is more effective in attacking ResNet-50 than I-FGSM for similar RCD scores but at
a lower accuracy, while its effectiveness is on par with I-FGSM for ResNet-50-SHC. Moreover, for
vanilla CNNs, the robustness is highly related with the depth (or training difficulty) of architectures,
which suggests that the robustness is related to the back-propagation of attack gradients. On the other
hand, the SHC based ResNet-50 performs worse than ResNet-18 in 3 of 4 situations, and we will
further discuss on this observation in Section 4.2.
LocSearchAdv The LocSearchAdv algorithm is employed for examining the robustness of proposed
method to black-box attacks. We use most of the configurations proposed in the original paper,
with an increased number of pixels perturbed at each step. That is, 10 pixels are selected to be
perturbed for a non-stop 150 steps, thus a total of 1,500 pixels are selected and perturbed. The target
of perturbations is set to decrease the confidence of the correct class regardless of the fact that the
current image has been mis-classified already. We select 500 images that are correctly classified with
high confidence for both networks, and record the change of average accuracy and RCD at different
steps, these results are provided in Table 3. Obviously, the proposed method performs better within
the first dozens of steps of the LSA attack. It usually takes about 60 more steps for SHC models to
obtain similar RCD scores as the reference model obtains. An example of how the image changes
together with its confidence and RCD is shown in Figure 3. It is worth noticing that, given enough
attempts, the method is able to successfully generate adversarial examples for most images though, it
usually takes more attempts to fool the proposed method.
4 DISCUSSION
4.1 EFFECT OF BLACK-BOX ATTACKS TO CLASS DECISION BOUNDARY
Considering a binary image classification problem, a class decision boundary of a deep neural network
(DNN) can be defined as a hypersurface that partitions the input space into two target classes. Once
the optimization of the DNN is finished, the decision boundary is computed, and the robustness of
the DNN is determined by the properties of the decision boundary (Fawzi et al., 2016; 2017). In this
section, we employ the concept of the quasi decision boundary to examine the observed robustness
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Table 3: Model robustness against LSA attack. We select 500 images that are initially correctly
classified with high confidence (> 0.9), and we apply the LSA algorithm to search the corresponding
adversarial examples for 150 steps. We report the averaged RCD over attack steps.
Network
Step 30 Step 60 Step 90 Step 120 Step 150
Acc. RCD Acc. RCD Acc. RCD Acc. RCD Acc. RCD
Plain-10 87.2 1.40 77.8 2.03 69.0 2.46 63.0 2.82 57.8 3.14
Plain-10-SHC 97.8 0.75 93.2 1.19 87.0 1.55 82.2 1.84 78.4 2.14
ResNet-18 81.6 1.49 71.2 2.15 62.4 2.58 54.8 2.99 51.8 3.24
ResNet-18-SHC 93.4 0.75 88.9 1.11 84.0 1.43 80.2 1.66 75.2 1.85
ResNet-50 77.6 1.61 66.4 2.28 59.4 2.72 55.2 3.23 47.6 3.52
ResNet-50-SHC 90.4 0.80 84.0 1.22 77.0 1.55 72.4 1.87 67.6 2.15
(a) (b)
Figure 3: An example of an LSA attack towards (a) Vanilla ResNet-50, and (b) ResNet-50-SHC.
The change of confidence of correct class and RCD scores along with attack steps are depicted by
brown and blue curves, respectively. The images with “best” perturbations are shown at the top of
the figure. We mark the images that are correctly classified with green frames, and the images that
are mis-classified with red frames. We also provide the obtainedM at the last convolution layer of
ResNet-50-SHC. In this case, the confidence for vanilla ResNet-50 drops fast at the beginning of
the attack, and results in a failure in defence of the attack. The proposed method maintains a high
confidence until step 90, and correctly classified the adversarial examples at step 150.
of an SHC network, when a network is attacked by a black-box greedy search algorithm such as
LocSearchAdv.
Given an SHC network FW,T and an input image I , we define a neighbourhood of an input as the
set of images that differ from the input by small perturbations by
BI = {J |D(I,J) < 1,D(Tθ(I),Tθ(J)) < 2},
while the change of the output of the HyperNetwork with respect to the perturbations can be ignored.
We assume that, the perturbed images from LSA at each step are in the neighbourhood of the current
input, since the perturbation of several pixels can barely result in changes of statistics. Figure 3(b)
provides an example of the change ofM due to perturbations at every 30 steps. Now we state that a
quasi decision boundary, is the decision boundary of a sub-network FH, whereH = {H}Ll=1 is the
set of convolution kernels that are computed by the HyperNetwork with respect to an input image I
and its neighbourhood.
When the problem is restricted to classification of the given image and the images belonging to its
neighbourhood, this type of quasi decision boundary can be considered as a good approximation of the
true decision boundary. However, it will be broken once the target is out from the neighbourhood. We
could consider the greedy search algorithm of LSA as follows: at each step, a set of random perturbed
inputs {Iˆ} ⊂ BI is used to estimate the strength of perturbations. Then, the best perturbations are
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Table 4: An experimental analysis of robustness of the model to adversarial examples generated using
gradients from different routes. We attack 5,000 images that are initially correctly classified with
high confidence (> 0.9). The accuracy and RCD score are averaged over the corresponding 5,000
adversarial examples.
Network
RAND-FGSM
Network
RAND-FGSM
Acc.(%) RCD Acc.(%) RCD
ResNet-18 1.94 11.46 ResNet-18-SHC-T 98.5 1.18
ResNet-18-SHC 28.16 9.21 ResNet-18-SHC-W 2.6 13.29
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 4: The gradients ∇IJ obtained from different routes. (a) Red channel of the input image,
(b) full gradients obtained from both routes, (c) gradients obtained from the convolution route, (d)
gradients obtained from the HyperNetwork route.
accumulated to generate the adversarial image I ′. However as the progress goes on, the strength of
perturbations estimated in former steps will become untrustworthy, since the image I ′ is more likely
to have left the neighbourhood of former inputs as a consequence of the accumulated perturbations.
Thus the attack progress will be halted or even reversed due to the unreliability until it finds the
perturbations that breaks the true decision boundary of FW,T .
4.2 EFFECT OF HYPERNETWORKS AGAINST WHITE-BOX ATTACKS
The results in Table 2 appears that the ResNet-50-SHC performs worse towards most gradient base
methods, compared to ResNet-18-SHC , regardless of the better accuracy it obtained using clean
images and the images perturbed by Gaussian noise. Meanwhile we notice that, for vanilla CNN
models, the robustness is related to the training difficulty and the gradient propagation of architectures.
Thus in order to analyze the robustness of SHC model, we further carry out a set of experiments to
separately attack the sub-network FH and HyperNetworks Tθ, respectively. More precisely, we block
the gradients that pass through Tθ (the HyperNetworks route) when attacking FH, and vice versa.
Note that these procedures are only employed in generating adversarial examples with respect to
the partially back-propagated attack gradients, while the generated examples are still fed into the
whole SHC-network for evaluation. Figure 4 shows an example of the gradients∇IJ obtained from
different routes.
We employ the RAND-FGSM attack and report the results in Table 4. It can be observed that the
proposed method is as easy to be fooled as a vanilla CNN, if we only consider the gradients passing
through its sub-network FH (SHC-W, which can be treated as a vanilla CNN regarding a single input).
On the other hand, most of the examples, which only receive the adversarial attack gradients that
are obtained from the HyperNetworks (SHC-T), can be still correctly classified with small decrease
in confidence. This observation suggests that employment of the HyperNetworks together with the
statistical properties of input data and features is helpful for weakening (dispersing) the adversarial
attack gradients.
5 CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a simple yet effective method to improve robustness of convolutional neural
networks (CNNs) to adversarial attacks by training CNNs using data dependent adaptive convolution
kernels. To this end, we employ HyperNetworks to dynamically generate data dependent convolution
kernels with statistical properties of input data and features. The robustness of our proposed method
is verified using 3 different types of attack with state-of-the-art CNN models trained on the ILSVRC-
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2012 dataset. Moreover, the robustness is obtained spontaneously during a normal training progress
without losing any performance in the original tasks. This shed light on building practical deep
learning systems that focus on the target without a concern of attacker. On the other hand, there
still exists uncertainty on the mechanism of the robustness remains to be solved in the future works.
Furthermore, designing of network architectures that employ more powerful HyperNetworks with
better adversarial robustness is still an open problem.
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